X
Search Filters
Format Format
Format Format
X
Sort by Item Count (A-Z)
Filter by Count
Journal Article (2840) 2840
Publication (255) 255
Book Chapter (82) 82
Dissertation (54) 54
Book / eBook (40) 40
Paper (13) 13
Magazine Article (11) 11
Conference Proceeding (10) 10
Book Review (2) 2
Government Document (2) 2
Electronic Resource (1) 1
Newspaper Article (1) 1
more...
Subjects Subjects
Subjects Subjects
X
Sort by Item Count (A-Z)
Filter by Count
corporate governance (1280) 1280
business, finance (1115) 1115
management (1079) 1079
chief executive officers (1078) 1078
ceo (759) 759
economics (749) 749
firm (748) 748
executives (739) 739
ceo compensation (718) 718
compensation (717) 717
business (710) 710
performance (665) 665
firm performance (663) 663
compensation and benefits (649) 649
executive compensation (632) 632
studies (618) 618
incentives (579) 579
mergers, acquisitions, restructuring, voting, proxy contests, corporate governance (547) 547
firms (536) 536
analysis (511) 511
ownership (486) 486
personnel management, executives, executive compensation (457) 457
executive-compensation (436) 436
governance (416) 416
directors (369) 369
ceo turnover (310) 310
ownership structure (309) 309
financing policy, financial risk and risk management, capital and ownership structure, value of firms, goodwill (308) 308
boards of directors (286) 286
u.s (281) 281
northern america (278) 278
pay (274) 274
personnel economics: compensation and compensation methods and their effects (253) 253
earnings management (243) 243
financial performance (243) 243
agency theory (231) 231
firm performance: size, diversification, and scope (228) 228
research (224) 224
business structures (221) 221
determinants (213) 213
agency costs (195) 195
stock options (191) 191
ceos (189) 189
market (182) 182
risk (176) 176
investment (173) 173
turnover (171) 171
shareholder (166) 166
ceo pay (165) 165
risk-taking (163) 163
empirical-analysis (158) 158
business schools (154) 154
information (151) 151
china (149) 149
shareholders (143) 143
ceo overconfidence (142) 142
impact (139) 139
board composition (138) 138
managerial incentives (136) 136
ceo duality (135) 135
institutional investors (134) 134
earnings (132) 132
contracts (131) 131
managers (131) 131
accounting (130) 130
business management (116) 116
influence (114) 114
behavior (113) 113
leadership (111) 111
economics / management science (108) 108
board of directors (107) 107
power (104) 104
acquisitions (102) 102
banks (100) 100
capital structure (98) 98
company law (98) 98
upper echelons (98) 98
ethics (96) 96
innovation (96) 96
asia (94) 94
finance (94) 94
boards (92) 92
g34 (92) 92
stockholders (92) 92
overconfidence (91) 91
ceo power (89) 89
accounting/auditing (88) 88
equity (87) 87
financial management (87) 87
stocks (86) 86
agency (85) 85
business ethics (85) 85
executive dismissals (85) 85
moral hazard (85) 85
outside directors (85) 85
succession (85) 85
competition (84) 84
methods (84) 84
board (83) 83
corporate social responsibility (83) 83
more...
Library Location Library Location
Library Location Library Location
X
Sort by Item Count (A-Z)
Filter by Count
Robarts - Stacks (15) 15
UofT at Mississauga - Stacks (6) 6
Collection Dvlpm't (Acquisitions) - Vendor file (3) 3
Online Resources - Online (3) 3
UofT at Scarborough - Stacks (3) 3
Collection Dvlpm't (Acquisitions) - Closed Orders (2) 2
Indust. Rel's & Hum. Resources (Newman) - Library use only (2) 2
Law (Bora Laskin) - Stacks (1) 1
UTL at Downsview - May be requested (1) 1
UofT at Scarborough - May be requested in 6-10 wks (1) 1
more...
Language Language
Language Language
X
Sort by Item Count (A-Z)
Filter by Count
English (2940) 2940
Chinese (51) 51
Korean (27) 27
German (4) 4
Afrikaans (2) 2
Spanish (2) 2
Swedish (2) 2
Persian (1) 1
more...
Publication Date Publication Date
Click on a bar to filter by decade
Slide to change publication date range


The Review of Financial Studies, ISSN 0893-9454, 04/2018, Volume 31, Issue 4, pp. 1418 - 1459
Abstract We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO... 
BUSINESS, FINANCE | RISK-TAKING | STOCK-OPTIONS | MANAGEMENT TURNOVER | CEO TURNOVER | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | ECONOMICS | MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES | FIRM PERFORMANCE | RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS | EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION | PEER GROUPS
Journal Article
Journal of Financial Economics, ISSN 0304-405X, 2006, Volume 80, Issue 3, pp. 511 - 529
We provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO's potential total... 
Stock options | Earnings management | CEO compensation | BUSINESS, FINANCE | PRICES | earnings management | OFFERINGS | stock options | COMPENSATION | PERFORMANCE | ACCRUALS | ECONOMICS | OWNERSHIP | STOCK | Executives | Chief executive officers | Compensation and benefits | Management | Analysis
Journal Article
Journal Article
Journal of Financial Economics, ISSN 0304-405X, 2011, Volume 99, Issue 1, pp. 11 - 26
We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some... 
Insider trading | CEO incentives | CEO compensation | Financial crisis | COMPENSATION | PERFORMANCE | PAY | RISK | BUSINESS, FINANCE | CONSEQUENCES | ECONOMICS | MARKET-EFFICIENCY | OWNERSHIP | EQUITY | Financial crisis CEO compensation CEO incentives Insider trading
Journal Article
Review of Finance, ISSN 1572-3097, 1/2009, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp. 115 - 145
Operating performance and stock return results imply that managers who commit fraud anticipate large stock price declines if they were to report truthfully,... 
EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS | ANNOUNCEMENTS | GOVERNANCE | COMPENSATION | PERFORMANCE | K42 | G34 | M52 | M41 | CEO | EXECUTIVE PAY | STOCK OPTION AWARDS | BUSINESS, FINANCE | SHAREHOLDER WEALTH | ECONOMICS | DIRECTORS
Journal Article
Journal of Accounting and Economics, ISSN 0165-4101, 08/2015, Volume 60, Issue 1, pp. 1 - 17
We examine the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and corporate tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities that involve... 
Tax avoidance | FIN 48 | Corporate governance | CEO incentives | Tax aggressiveness | PRICES | EVASION | BUSINESS, FINANCE | RISK-TAKING INCENTIVES | INCOME | AGGRESSIVENESS | ECONOMICS | QUANTILE REGRESSION APPROACH | Tax planning | Tax incentives | Tax evasion
Journal Article
The Journal of Finance, ISSN 0022-1082, 8/2004, Volume 59, Issue 4, pp. 1619 - 1649
This paper illustrates why firms might choose to implement stock option plans or other pay instruments that reward "luck." I consider a model where adjusting... 
Risk aversion | Industrial market | Profit sharing plans | Stock options | Financial risk | Labor markets | Economic rent | Risk premiums | Business risks | Wages | RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION | BUSINESS, FINANCE | MARKET | MORAL HAZARD | CONTRACTS | COMPENSATION | TEAMS | CEOS | Incentive stock options | Financial instruments | Analysis | Employee stock ownership plans | Financial analysis | Methods
Journal Article
Journal of Financial Economics, ISSN 0304-405X, 2010, Volume 97, Issue 2, pp. 263 - 278
We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies and show that the risk-taking incentives of... 
Cash balance | Accrual | Incentives | Debt maturity | Capital structure | RISK-MANAGEMENT | STOCK-OPTIONS | EARNINGS MANAGEMENT | FINANCING DECISIONS | CASH HOLDINGS | DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE | ORGANIZATIONAL FORM | BUSINESS, FINANCE | ECONOMICS | MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES | EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION | Capital structure Cash balance Debt maturity Accrual Incentives
Journal Article
Journal of Financial Economics, ISSN 0304-405X, 2012, Volume 103, Issue 2, pp. 350 - 376
This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of... 
Firm risk | Tournament incentives | Corporate policies | COMPENSATION | PERFORMANCE | PAY | STOCK | BUSINESS, FINANCE | LUCK | REDUCTION | INVESTMENT | ECONOMICS | RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS | Incentive services | Employment discrimination
Journal Article
Journal of Corporate Finance, ISSN 0929-1199, 10/2015, Volume 34, pp. 251 - 267
This paper identifies a new incentive for managers to engage in corporate fraud stemming from the relative performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion... 
CEO pay gap | Tournament incentives | Corporate fraud | GOVERNANCE | CONTRACTS | COMPENSATION | BUSINESS, FINANCE | IMPACT | MANAGERS | OWNERSHIP | JOB | FIRM | LITIGATION | Executives | Compensation and benefits | Fraud | Corporations | Ethical aspects
Journal Article
Journal of Financial Economics, ISSN 0304-405X, 2011, Volume 102, Issue 1, pp. 183 - 198
We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how... 
Value of cash | Cash holdings | Managerial incentives | GOVERNANCE | DETERMINANTS | BEHAVIOR | RETURNS | RISK | DEBT | BUSINESS, FINANCE | CONSTRAINTS | ECONOMICS | AGENCY COSTS | FIRM | EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION | Cash holdings Value of cash Managerial incentives | Executives | Chief executive officers | Compensation and benefits | Corporate governance
Journal Article