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by Levin J
The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, 06/2003, Volume 93, Issue 3, pp. 835 - 857
Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper... 
Moral hazard models | Economic theory | Repeated games | Incentive pay | Performance metrics | Cost incentives | Surplus | Contract incentives | Contracts | Cost efficiency | AGENT | REPEATED GAMES | MORAL HAZARD | INFORMATION | PERFORMANCE | PRINCIPAL | COLLUSION | ECONOMICS | UNEMPLOYMENT | EXPLICIT | IMPLICIT CONTRACTS | Economic aspects | Employee incentives | Analysis | Compensation management | Studies | Economic models | Incentives | Optimization
Journal Article
The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, 10/2013, Volume 103, Issue 6, pp. 2328 - 2351
Journal Article
The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, 4/2012, Volume 102, Issue 2, pp. 750 - 779
This article studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known. I consider a... 
Trade | Economic value | Incentive pay | Bargaining power | Information economics | Wages | Surplus | Pareto efficiency | Contract incentives | Contracts | STARTING SMALL | INCOMPLETE INFORMATION | ECONOMICS | INCENTIVE CONTRACTS | FIRM | SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM | IMPLICIT CONTRACTS | Economic aspects | Usage | Research | Agency (Law) | Personal information | Studies | Agency theory
Journal Article
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, ISSN 8756-6222, 05/2017, Volume 33, Issue 2, pp. 301 - 331
The need to give incentives is usually absent in the literature on minimum wages. However, especially in the service sector it is important how well a job is... 
FAST-FOOD INDUSTRY | LAW | INFORMATION | ECONOMICS | EMPLOYMENT | UNEMPLOYMENT | IMPLICIT CONTRACTS | Usage | Quality control | Employee incentives | Influence | Minimum wage | Research | Wages | Methods | Labor contracts
Journal Article
Journal of Economic Literature, ISSN 0022-0515, 9/2007, Volume 45, Issue 3, pp. 595 - 628
Journal Article
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, 2/2002, Volume 117, Issue 1, pp. 39 - 84
Journal Article
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, ISSN 0034-6527, 04/2017, Volume 84, Issue 2, pp. 816 - 852
We develop a theory of contracts with limited enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship. The seller is privately informed on his persistent cost,... 
STARTING SMALL | RELATIONAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS | REPEATED GAMES | Breach of contracts | COOPERATION | RENEGOTIATION | Asymmetric information | Enforcement | COSTS | COMMITMENT | Dynamic contracts | PRIVATE INFORMATION | ECONOMICS | LITIGATION | IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
Journal Article
Journal of Accounting and Economics, ISSN 0165-4101, 04/2016, Volume 61, Issue 2-3, pp. 369 - 390
We study a dynamic multi-agent model with a verifiable team performance measure and non-verifiable individual measures. The optimal contract can be interpreted... 
D86 | Bonus pools | Relational contracts | Non-verifiable performance measures | Dynamic contracting | M41 | C70 | D82 | Relative performance evaluation | OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS | INFORMATION | BUSINESS, FINANCE | INDICATORS | TEAMS | COLLUSION | ECONOMICS | IMPLICIT CONTRACTS | PERFORMANCE-MEASURES | SCHEMES | Analysis | Business schools
Journal Article
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, ISSN 1058-6407, 2016, Volume 25, Issue 4, pp. 936 - 957
We study a repeated contracting model in which the agent has private information and the performance measure is unverifiable. In an optimal stationary... 
ECONOMICS | MANAGEMENT | INCENTIVE CONTRACTS | UNEMPLOYMENT | MECHANISM DESIGN | IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
Journal Article
Strategic Management Journal, ISSN 0143-2095, 02/2020, Volume 41, Issue 2, pp. 222 - 245
Journal Article
Management Accounting Research, ISSN 1044-5005, 06/2019, Volume 43, pp. 45 - 60
Subjective bonuses can reflect implicit contracts entered at the beginning of the period when certain employees commit to more difficult targets and managers... 
implicit contracts | relative target difficulty | subjective bonuses | goal commitment | MANAGEMENT | ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE | INFORMATION | MODEL | RATCHET | BUSINESS, FINANCE | DISCRETION | RELATIONAL CONTRACTS | FAIRNESS | TRUST | PERFORMANCE-MEASURES | Employee motivation | Business schools | Bonuses
Journal Article
Journal of public economic theory, ISSN 1097-3923, 2017, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp. 331 - 361
Academic research is a public good whose production is supported by the tuition‐paying students that a faculty's research accomplishments attract. A... 
Arbeitsvertrag | Vertragsrecht | Betriebszugehörigkeit | Theorie | Hochschullehrer | LIFE-CYCLE | ECONOMISTS | SCIENTISTS | OR-OUT CONTRACTS | RETIREMENT | HIGHER-EDUCATION | SALARIES | ECONOMICS | RESEARCH PRODUCTIVITY | IMPLICIT
Journal Article
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, ISSN 1945-7669, 11/2018, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp. 248 - 88
In many jobs, the worker generates only subjective performance measures privately observed by the employer, and contracts must rely on employer reports about... 
ECONOMICS | UNEMPLOYMENT | IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
Journal Article
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, ISSN 1945-7669, 8/2015, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp. 318 - 346
We investigate whether formal contracts can help in resolving the holdup problem by studying repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. Contrary to... 
Fixed price contracts | Trade | Contract negotiations | Induced investment | Temptation | Microeconomics | Trade surplus | Contracts | Contract incentives | Investment value | INTEGRATION | COOPERATIVE INVESTMENTS | STANDARD BREACH REMEDIES | ECONOMICS | HOLD-UP PROBLEM | EXPLICIT CONTRACTS | OWNERSHIP | INCENTIVE CONTRACTS | RENEGOTIATION | FIRM | IMPLICIT CONTRACTS | Studies | Economic theory | Analysis
Journal Article